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REVISITING THE "MCCARTHY ERA":*
LOOKING AT WILKINSON V. UNITED STATES
IN LIGHT OF WILKINSON V. FEDERAL
B UREA U OF INVESTIGATION
Frank Wilkinson**
Frank Wilkinson was an administrator with the Los Angeles
Public Housing Authority responsible for recommending sites for the
post-World War II public housing program. In this capacity, he rec-
ommended and the City Council and Housing Authority approved
sites outside the barrios or ghettos of Los Angeles. The placement of
these sites was characterized as "creeping socialism" by those op-
posed, and suddenly, Wilkinson 's personal affiliations became an is-
sue, and his life as a target of government harassment and scrutiny
began. This unwanted, and often unconstitutional attention last-
ed for more than thirty years. Mr. Wilkinson offers a compelling
* Most people know the years that the House Committee on Un-
American Activities (HUAC) conducted hearings to root out suspected Com-
munists and Communist sympathizers as the "McCarthy Era." It is a total
misnomer to characterize the repressive years of the HUACs, the anti-
Communist laws of the 1940s and 1950s, the witch-hunting and blacklisting
that continued at least into the early 1970s as the McCarthy Era. Joseph
McCarthy was only briefly on the scene.
** Frank Wilkinson, Executive Director Emeritus of National Committee
Against Repressive Legislation and Executive Director of the First Amend-
ment Foundation, recently received the Roger Baldwin Medal of Liberty.
Frank Wilkinson has also received the American Civil Liberties Union Eason
Monroe Courageous Advocate Award, the Earl Warren Civil Liberties Award,
and the 1997 National Lawyers' Guild Legal Worker of the Year. The author
would like to thank the following dedicated attorneys: Wilkinson v. United
States, Rowland Watts and Nannstte Dembitz, Of Counsel, from the National
Office of the American Civil Liberties Union; Wilkinson v. FBI, Philip J.
Hirschkop, Of Counsel, Virginia, Fred Okrand of the American Civil Liberties
Union Foundation of Southern California, and Douglas E. Mirell and Paul
Hoffinan, Volunteer American Civil Liberties Union Counsel of Loeb & Loeb,
LLP.
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example of how the cold war took its toll on our society's protection
of individualfreedoms.
Like other aspects of government, the American legal system felt
the influence of anti-Communist fervor. Mr. Wilkinson's testimony
before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, his life as a
subject of covert FBI activities, and the litigation that resulted from
those experiences all make Frank Wilkinson uniquely representative
of this important and troubling period. The Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review is grateful for his reminiscences and his contribution to
the "Trials of the Century" Symposium.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1958, I was subpoenaed to appear at a hearing before the
House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC)' in Atlanta,
Georgia. After refusing to answer HUAC's questions about my po-
litical affiliations on the grounds that those affiliations were pro-
tected by the First Amendment,2 I was held in contempt of Congress.
With counsel provided by the National Office of the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), we fought that subpoena all the way to the
United States Supreme Court. But in 1961, by a five to four vote, the
Court denied my First Amendment challenge to HUAC's subpoena.3
As a result, I was sentenced to serve the maximum twelve months on
the contempt charge, but since I received three months off for good
time, I ultimately spent ninth months incarcerated in federal prisons.
In 1980, the National Committee Against Repressive Legislation
(NCARL), of which I was the executive director, filed suit against
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) under the Freedom of
1. HUAC became a permanent standing committee in 1946. See RICHARD
CRILEY, THE FBI v. THE FIRST AMENDMENT 8 (1997). HUAC was "mandated
to investigate 'subversive and un-American propaganda activities."' Id. at 24.
This power came from congressional acts like the Smith Act and the Commu-
nist Control Act of 1954. See Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1940); Communist
Control Act, 50 U.S.C. § 842 (1954). "[HUAC] was armed with the power to
compel testimony under subpoena, and to punish with citations for contempt of
Congress." CRILEY, supra, at 24-25.
2. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
3. See Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 400 (1961). The Su-
preme Court denied a companion case, brought by Carl Braden, by the same
vote at the same time. See Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431, 435 (1961).
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Information Act4 to compel the FBI to release their files on me. In
the fourth year of that trial, a federal district court judge ordered the
FBI to turn over, with minor redactions, approximately 132,000
pages of reports the FBI had collected on NCARL and me over the
course of thirty-eight years. 5 The files revealed that the FBI, under
the direction of J. Edgar Hoover, had me under surveillance from the
time I was twenty-eight, through 1980, when I was sixty-five, and
had targeted NCARL under various FBI "neutralization" programs
for thirty-eight years. In my capacity as executive director of
NCARL and its predecessor--the National Committee to Abolish
HUAC-I was a prime target of J. Edgar Hoover's infamous
COINTELPRO6 program COINTELPRO was a secret, anti-
democratic campaign waged by the FBI from the 1950s to 1975.
The extent of the FBI's attacks, unknown to me as I testified be-
fore HUAC, justify a fresh look at Wilkinson v. United States.7
Every negative aspect of my life for a thirty-eight year period was di-
rectly orchestrated by the FBI and J. Edgar Hoover. The 132,000
pages of FBI reports represented repeated examples of violations of
my rights under the Constitution.
In the light of this new information, Wilkinson v. United States
and the HUAC hearings that led up to that decision evidence a
4. See The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1999).
5. See Wilkinson v. FBI, 633 F. Supp. 336, 338 (C.D. Cal. 1986); see also
CRILEY, supra note 1, at 8 (noting that Wilkinson's counsel received 132,000
surveillance documents from the FBI during pre-trial discovery in Wilkinson v.
FBi).
6. COINTELPRO--COunterNTELigence PROgrams--'is the FBI acro-
nym for a series of covert programs directed against domestic group[s] . .."
like the United States Communist Party, the Socialist Labor Party, Students for
Democratic Society, the Blank Panther Party, and briefly in 1965 and 1966, the
Ku Klux Klan. See CRILEY, supra note 1, at 9.
Many of the techniques used would be intolerable in a democratic so-
ciety even if all of the targets had been involved in violent activity, but
COTNTELPRO went far beyond that ... [The] Bureau conducted a
sophisticated vigilante operation aimed squarely at preventing the ex-
ercise of First Amendment rights of speech and association, on the
theory that preventing the growth of dangerous groups and the propa-
gation of dangerous ideas would protect the national security and deter
violence.
Id.
7. 365 U.S. 399 (1961).
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concerted effort to harass, obstruct, and otherwise neutralize-fortu-
nately unsuccessfully--the movement to abolish HUAC!
8
II. A NEW LOOKAT WILKINSON V. UNITED STATESIN LIGHT OF
WILKNSON V FBI
A. General Perspective and Context
During the McCarthy Era or post-World War II cold war era of
the 1950s, HUAC and the many states' "little HJACs"9 were hold-
ing many hearings under the guise of attempting to weed-out sus-
pected Communist sympathizers. California averaged five hearings
each year from 1950 to 1960.
During the 1950s, I received three subpoenas from various in-
quisitorial committees of government. First, in 1952, I received a
subpoena from the California State Senate "little HUAC."' ° Second,
in 1956, I received a subpoena from the House of Representatives'
HUAC to come to appear in Los Angeles." Finally, in 1958, I re-
ceived a subpoena from HUAC to appear at a hearing in Atlanta,
Georgia. My refusal to testify at that time based on my First
Amendment rights became the subject of Wilkinson v. United
States.1
2
B. FBI Involvement in HUA C Hearings
At that time, I did not believe that the FBI was directly involved
in any of those subpoenas; however, some who were subpoenaed
8. In 1960, a group of civil rights activists from across the country, in-
cluding myself, met to formally announce the formation of the National Com-
mittee to Abolish HUAC (Committee). See CmrLEY, supra note 1, at 31. Im-
mediately thereafter, the FBI put the Committee under surveillance. See id.
9. Inquisitorial organizations on the state level during this era were known
as "little HUACs." See CRILEY, supra note 1, at 24.
10. In a closed session, I refused to answer questions relating to my politi-
cal associations. As a result, I was fired from the Housing Authority. The
witch-hunt continued, and the housing program subsequently collapsed. See
CRILEY, supra note 1, at 36.
11. I refused to answer questions at this hearing by invoking the First
Amendment. The full committee of HUAC at that time voted to cite me for
contempt, but did not bring the case before the full Congress for a vote. See
CRILEY, supra note 1, at 40.
12. 365 U.S. 399 (1961).
684
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thought there might be a connection between a hostile home visit by
the FBI a month or two before the HUAC subpoena was received
and the subpoena process. Looking at my own case, the FBI ap-
peared to have had significant participation in the decisions of
HUAC and California's little HUAC to subpoena me.
In 1952, there was a contest between the California little HUAC
and the House of Representatives' HUAC to see who could be first
to subpoena me. The fervor to subpoena me arose out of the political
criticism I was receiving for recommending sites for the Public
Housing Act of 1949.13 I chose large low-income housing sites, the
Chavez Ravine and Rose Hill projects, outside the barrios and ghet-
tos, in the area where Dodger Stadium now sits instead. This politi-
cal criticism was apparent in a related eminent domain proceeding
where I, testifying as an expert on the conditions of the barrios and
ghettos, was asked about my political associations. I declined to an-
swer any questions as to my political associations from the lawyers
representing the slum landlords. 14
The FBI clearly had a hand in creating this controversy. I
learned at that time that Los Angeles Chief of Police Parker con-
tacted, or was contacted by, J. Edgar Hoover, after which, Hoover
provided the chief of police with some sort of dossier on me. This
document was apparently then given to the attorneys for the slum
landlords and, presumably, was the basis for my unanswered ques-
tion. The same dossier was later utilized by the chief of police in the
1953 mayoral election to make a "guilt by association" charge
13. See Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (enacted
with the goal to "remedy the serious housing shortage, the elimination of sub-
standard, and other inadequate housing through the clearance of slums and
blighted areas"). I chose such sites in conformance with Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948). Shelley was a United States Supreme Court case ending re-
strictive covenants on land based on race, and thus allowed integrated projects.
See id. at 13-23.
14. My refusal to answer such questions invited public speculation. The
Housing Authority was accused of being "Red" controlled, and I was subse-
quently dismissed from my position with the Housing Authority. As a result,
the housing placement project collapsed. In the Chavez Ravine and Rose Hill
projects, 5500 units of the 10,000 unit program were cancelled. Instead, the
Housing Authority decided to build those lost units in the very barrios and
ghettos I had tried to avoid.
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against Mayor Fletcher Bowron, who utilized my services on a pro-
public housing educational TV program.
Out of all this controversy and fervor, the California little
HUAC located me with its subpoena first at the Good Samaritan
Hospital where I was then undergoing knee surgery. The informa-
tion below came to me from the doctors.
On awakening from the knee surgery, the medical staff told me
that three men, described as a Los Angeles police officer, a repre-
sentative from the FBI, and an officer from the California little
HUAC, came to the surgery unit asking to speak to me. The hospital
staff informed the three men that I was under the effects of sodium
pentothal. The three men waited until I was moved, still uncon-
scious, to a recovery room. Although stopped initially from entering
the room by the nurses, the three men later demanded entry. Unsuc-
cessful in awakening me by shouting and manually opening my eyes
to see their badges, they took a safety pin from a nurse and pinned
the subpoena from the California little HUAC on my surgical gown!
C. 1956 HUAC Case: FBInvolvement Increases
With the release of information pursuant to Wilkinson v. FBI,'5
evidence surfaced of the FBI's advance planning to interfere with my
new work with the Citizens Committee to Preserve American Free-
doms (CCPAF).16 CCPAF had been successful in defending those
subpoenaed before HUAC hearings in both Southern and Northern
California.
The FBI files reported the preparation of data by all agents fol-
lowing me-at times eight agents a day--to be used as "Prosecuting
Summaries." The agents then submitted these summaries to the
Justice Department for possible indictment and prosecution under
the 1940 Smith Act. 17 Altogether, a dozen of such "Summaries"
were submitted and returned by those Attorneys General to J. Edgar
15. 633 F. Supp. 336 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
16. The attempted FBI interferences in CCPAF began in the 1950s but
continued at least until 1975.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1990). This Act makes it a felony to advocate the
overthrow of the government of the United States. Being a member or affiliate
of a group who advocates the overthrow of the government provides a basis for
prosecution under the Smith Act. See id.
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Hoover. In doing so, they indicated that he lacked meaningful evi-
dence of wrongdoing against me.
At the same time, J. Edgar Hoover instructed agents investigat-
ing my case to locate an informer who might name me as a "Com-
munist."
D. First Amendment Challenge Surprised HUAC in 1956
By coincidence, on the night before I received this first HUAC
subpoena, I read the testimony of Dr. Alexander Meiklejohn 18 before
the 1955 United States Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights (Subcommittee), headed by Senator Thomas Carey Hennings
Jr. In that testimony, Dr. Meiklejohn best expressed his judgment in
regard to the First Amendment's application in a political arena. Dr.
Meiklejohn told the Subcommittee:
The First Amendment seems to me to be a very un-
compromising statement.... Congress and, by implication,
all other agencies of government are denied any authority
whatever to limit the political freedom of the citizens of the
United States. It declares that with respect to political be-
lief, political discussion, political advocacy, political plan-
ning, our citizens are sovereign, and Congress is their
subordinate agent.... No subordinate agency of the gov-
ernment has the authority to ask, under compulsion to an-
swer, what a citizen's political commitments are.19
With Dr. Meiklejobn's testimony fresh in my mind, I reflected
later that night on just what my position might be if I were to be sub-
poenaed before HUAC. I had only been involved in civil liberties
work for four years, but I had witnessed many hearings and seen
the damage done by HUAC. Indeed, my wife and other teachers had
been discharged by the Board of Education after appearances be-
fore HUAC committees. Even my own Methodist Bishop, James C.
Baker, had seventeen citations for un-American activities. While
18. Dr. Meildejohn was widely respected. He served on the ACLU Na-
tional Board and his interpretation of the First Amendment was respected by
several United States Supreme Courtjustices. See CRILEY, supra note 1, at 38-
40. Dr. Meiklejohn was also a recipient of the Congressional Medal of Free-
dom from President Kennedy.
19. CRILEY, supra note 1, at38.
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respectful of the parallel common law antecedents of the First and
Fifth Amendments, and knowledgeable of a recent Supreme Court
decision accepting the Fifth Amendment as a valid protection at such
hearings, 20 I decided that as a matter of conscience and personal re-
sponsibility, I would take my stand on the First Amendment.
Amazingly, at seven o'clock the next morning, there was a
knock on my front door by a subpoena server for HUAC. How pre-
scient of HUAC and the FBI!
1. Preparing to confront HUAC
In preparation for the hearing, I sought the advice of a number
of lawyers on how to frame my First Amendment argument so that
there would be no extraneous issues raised. If possible, I wanted to
confront the Supreme Court as narrowly as possible, testing the
Meiklejohn First Amendment thesis. I desired that the Court either
remove from HUAC the power of the compulsory processes in such
a political interrogation, or send me to prison. The response of the
assembled lawyers-all good friends-was both surprising and trou-
bling. All but three left, indicating in a variety of ways that they did
not wish to participate. The remaining three were Abraham Lincoln
Wirin, Fred Okrand of the ACLU, and Daniel Marshall of the
Catholic Lawyers Association. My supportive wife at the time, Jean
Benson, perturbed by the lack of legal support, turned to the sweet
and somewhat mystical Dan Marshall, and asked Dan what he
thought. He replied, "Jeannie, sometimes you have to listen to the
still small voices." It helped us both.
2. Confronting HUAC
I had prepared a response to any HUAC questions as to my po-
litical associations. I felt that the First Amendment prohibited such
questioning under compulsion. So at the hearing, I read the follow-
ing sentences we had prepared:
I challenge, in the most fundamental sense, the legality
of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. It is
my opinion that this committee stands in direct violation by
20. See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 165 (1955); see also Emspak
v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955) (companion case to Quinn).
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its mandate and by its practices of the [F]irst [A]mendment
to the United States Constitution. It is my belief that Con-
gress had no authority to establish this committee in the
first instance, nor to instruct it with the mandate which it
has.
I have the utmost respect for the broad powers which
the Congress of the United States must have to carry on
its investigations for legislative purposes. However, the
United States Supreme Court has held that, broad as these
powers may be, the Congress cannot investigate into an
area where it cannot legislate, and this committee tends, by
its mandate and by its practices, to investigate into precisely
those areas of free speech, religion, peaceful association
and assembly, and the press, wherein it cannot legislate and
therefore it cannot investigate.2 '
HUAC counsel interrupted repeatedly, but I stated my reasons.
Thereafter, I said, over and over again, "My answer is my answer."
Richard Arens, HUAC counsel, could not reconcile that I was not
using the Fifth Amendment. They went on and on with sarcastic in-
sinuations, and they divided among themselves as to whether I had
used the Fifth Amendment. They had the clerk re-read my testi-
mony. Finally, a member noted that I was wearing a hearing aid.
The HUAC chair left the dais and came to examine my ears, asking
loudly if I had heard them ask if I was invoking the Fifth Amend-
ment. I raised my voice slightly and replied that I had.
As important to me as the First Amendment stand I was taking
was, I was also equally appalled to witness the reckless and unprin-
cipled abuse HUAC was giving to the Fifth Amendment. If one took
the Fifth Amendment, it clearly meant to them that one was admit-
ting "guilt" and just "hiding" behind that Amendment.
22
HUAC voted to cite me for contempt of Congress. Then, it was
our turn for a surprise. As my attorney and I prepared to depart, we
21. Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1961) (reproducing
the words Wilkinson used at both the 1956 hearing and the 1958 HUAC hear-
ing where he was cited for contempt).
22. Recently this mode of thinking reared its ugly head when Oliver North
used the Fifth Amendment before Congress. Some of my own knowledgeable
friends immediately commented: "So, he's guilty."
January 2000]
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were sternly instructed to remain seated and under oath. Their coun-
sel called out a name. "Is Anita Belle Schneider in the audience?" A
woman at the back of the room rose and identified herself as Schnei-
der and agreed to be sworn in. She was asked if she knew me, and
she replied that she did. However, I had no recollection of having
ever before seen or heard the name of the woman. She identified
herself as living in San Diego and as having been invited by the FBI
in 1951 to become an undercover Communist. She reported that the
FBI so approved of her work infiltrating the Communist Party in San
Diego that they promoted her to infiltrate the Democratic Party. It
was only then that I recalled who she might be.
In 1955, while speaking at a Bill of Rights luncheon in Los An-
geles, a woman came to the podium, asking me to speak before the
Democratic Party in San Diego. I assured her that I would and of-
fered to give her some names of civil liberties supporters in San Di-
ego from our file. I did not see her again.
When she called the following year, she asked me to come to
San Diego to debate a HUAC subcommittee chair at a Democratic
Party affair. I told her that our CCPAF chair, Reverend A. A. Heist,
a retired director of the ACLU, would do better, and he agreed to go.
I never saw or heard from her again and had no recollection of her
appearance or name as she was sworn in.
At the hearing, HUAC counsel Richard Arens sought informa-
tion from her against me, as she had been found to identify me as a
Communist. Mr. Arens sought to establish a nexus between us by
asking her leading questions regarding my well-known work with the
CCPAF, as follows:
Mr. Arens. Was it [the Citizens Committee to Preserve
American Freedoms] Communist-controlled?
Mrs. Schneider. Yes.
Mr. Arens. Who was the ringleader in that organization?
Mrs. Schneider. I didn't work in that organization, and I
don't know who the ringleader was. My contact on that oc-
casion was with Frank Wilkinson, I believe.
Mr. Arens. Did you know him as a Communist?
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Mrs. Schneider. Yes. 23
Unfortunately, I was not allowed to cross-examine her. When I
received my subpoena and when I entered the hearing, I was given a
booklet from HUAC entitled: Rules of Procedure.24 The booklet
categorically stated that the Rules of Evidence, including the right of
cross-examination, did not apply in such proceedings.
Throughout its thirty-eight years of political witch-hunting, over
3500 witnesses were called and subject, with rare exceptions, to
public obliquity! HUAC's informers, while disliked, as have been
all informers of all ages, were in most cases protected by both the
FBI and HIJAC. The informants knew they would be protected from
charges of perjury and that their inquisitorial patrons could not sur-
vive or obtain convictions without them Thus, we had a flat conclu-
sive statement from an informant I did not know and would not rec-
ognize if she came to a podium today. She perjured herself, but
HUAC was not concerned.
My hearing before HUAC in Los Angeles occurred on Decem-
ber 6, 1956, just a little over a fortnight before that Congress ad-
journed. However, Congress provided for such an event; the Rules
of the House allowed the Speaker of the House to submit contempt
citations when Congress was adjourned. But for reasons still not
known, HUAC allowed me to walk away free with my First
Amendment challenge, and I was not cited for contempt. It was ob-
vious from HUAC's questioning that they were neither expecting nor
comfortable with my narrow First Amendment challenge. The rec-
ord invites speculation.
The FBI had now publicly exposed its informant. However, it
was not until 1989, in the tenth year of Wilkinson v. FJBI, that we re-
ceived documentation from the FBI indicating that they knew Anita
Belle Schneider was what their internal documents characterized as
"emotionally unstable." Nevertheless, beginning in 1957, the FBI
23. Wilkinson, 365 U.S. at419 n.6 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
24. COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN AcrwTiEs, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, RULES OF PROCEDURE (1961).
25. See id. at 7 n.5. "The Committee has given frequent and diligent con-
sideration to this subject, and has determined that in order to carry out its re-
sponsibilities, imposed by law, the rules of evidence, including cross-
examination, are not applicable." Id.
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published thousands of handbills quoting her as saying that I was a
"Communist." For the next twenty-three years, the FBI or HUAC
had a summary of her testimony against me printed as a flier and
placed on the seats of auditoriums where I spoke.
E. 1958 HUAC Hearing
1957 and 1958 were somewhat more positive times. While not
intended as a tactic, the public response to Carl Braden's and my ini-
tial First Amendment challenges of HUAC in 1956 was significant.
CCPAF itself shifted from merely providing a defense of those sub-
poenaed by HUAC to an open call for HUAC's abolition. In May of
1957, I was invited to come to New York to launch a campaign initi-
ated by the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee (ECLC) leaders:
Corliss Lamont, Harvey O'Connor, I.F. Stone, Carey McWilliams,
James Imbrie, Hugh H. Wilson, and others. Arriving in the heat of
August, we immediately rented Carnegie Hall as an appropriate place
to launch the campaign. Before departing from Los Angeles, I had
invited Dalton Trumbo to be the keynote speaker. He had just bro-
ken through the Hollywood blacklist with his Oscar-winning screen-
play under the pseudonym of Robert Rich. A professor of politics at
Princeton, Hugh Wilson, participated in the program with an added
call to our focus on the abolition of HUAC. Hugh Wilson urged
Congress to enact legislation that would limit the term of office of
the director of the FBI. However, even at that time, we still did not
know of the undermining COINTELPRO efforts launched by FBI di-
rector J. Edgar Hoover against us. J. Edgar Hoover covertly carried
on an intense redbaiting attack on ECLC, labeling it a "Communist
Inspired Campaign to Abolish the House Committee on Un-
American Activities and to Destroy the FBI." The extent to which
these attacks emanated directly from the FBI was not revealed until
the 1980s discovery findings in Wilkinson v. FBI.
At the same time, I also asked Dr. Alexander Meiklejohn to
draft a petition to Congress which in final form was co-signed by 100
professors of public law. With the help of that petition, I sought
editorial support from the editors of the Denver Post, St. Louis Post
Dispatch, and others, for the abolition of HUAC as I crossed the
country with my family.
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Although picketed by several hundred Hungarian Freedom
Fighters and interrupted for a half-hour midway by a stink bomb, the
Carnegie Hall meeting was a sell-out success.
Our publicity efforts increased throughout 1957. In December
of 1957, 800 people attended ECLC's Bill of Rights Dinner where
$25,000 was raised to organize on the national level what we had
done in California, namely the defense of those subpoenaed at
HUAC hearings anywhere in the country.
ECLC continued to move forward despite the full-court press
against it. But in July 1958, in Atlanta, HUAC made its next public
move by subpoenaing me.
My Atlanta subpoena came as one of a series of defensive re-
sponses we were making to each HUAC hearing. Atlanta was
HUAC's first incursion into the South. We had almost no notice. As
in Los Angeles in 1956, eleven others had been subpoenaed before I
received mine. At one day's notice, I was asked to meet with leaders
of the Southern Conference Educational Fund (SCEF) at the Atlanta
Biltmore Hotel at three o'clock the following afternoon. A petition
was being drafted for circulation to black churches, and I was asked
to come to assist. I arrived, went to my room, and within one minute
a federal marshal was at my door with a subpoena. I was dumb-
founded and asked him to tell me how he knew I was there, espe-
cially as I had never been in the South before. He simply told me
that the FBI had called from Washington the day before and told him
that they were sending a courier down with a subpoena, and that I
could be found at the Biltmore Hotel at 3:00 P.M. Although I am still
not sure how the FBI found out where I was, I have suspicions that it
was by a bug or a wiretap. I only made three calls: one to my wife,
one to the airline, and one to the National ACLU asking for informa-
tion regarding available lawyers in Atlanta. Later, in the 1980s, I
learned that for thirty-eight years all my phones had been tapped
without court search orders, and bugs had been planted, too. Further,
we also learned that the Washington, D.C. director of the ACLU was
an FBI informant who had been reporting some of my activities di-
rectly to high FBI officials.
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Although HUAC did not allow direct assistance by counsel for
those who were subpoenaed,26 Rowland Watts, my ACLU counsel,
set up one appointment after another with ACLU lawyers in Atlanta
for me to see and to arrange for them to at least sit beside me during
my testimony. Each was friendly and willing, but fearful of the
damage to their law practice if they accepted. By the day before the
HUAC hearing, I had eleven declinations.27 Rowland Watts then
asked the leading ACLU lawyer in Atlanta to see me. He met me
with apologies. His law partner was in Europe, he had no cable ad-
dress, and could not sit with me without his agreement. I made an
emergency call to Rowland Watts for direction. Without a lawyer
beside me, my case might be thrown out on the basis of no legal rep-
resentation. Rowland Watts thus directed me to decline if HUAC
asked me if I wanted a lawyer. So when the question was asked I
said no. As I did so, I looked toward the jury box in the federal
courtroom being used by HUAC. Some of the ACLU volunteer law-
yers were present to witness the hearing, yet the intimidation was
such that none felt they could afford to represent me.
The actual hearing in Atlanta was nearly identical to the 1956
hearing in Los Angeles. However, HUAC counsel Richard Arens
extended HUAC's rationale for questioning me, and Anita Belle
Schneider's informant role was incorporated only by reference.
Following HUAC's formal vote to cite me for contempt of Congress,
the House of Representatives voted 365-0 to indict me. Representa-
tive Nix of Pennsylvania, an African American, cast the single sup-
porting vote for Carl Braden, my co-defendant.
The ACLU's Rowland Watts contacted the Justice Department
prosecutors to offer my presence for the formal arraignment and
26. "Counsel shall not be permitted to engage in oral argument with the
Committee, but shall confine his activity to the area of legal advice of his cli-
ent" COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, supra note 24 at 4.
27. As could be seen in the very realistic fears of the civil liberties lawyers,
there was tension in Atlanta. It was only four years after Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Georgih was leading a stonewall of
southern states in the refusal to implement integration per the Brown decision.
At this time during a gubernatorial race, I was appalled to see a full-page
advertisement in an Atlanta newspaper by the incumbent governor containing a
montage of press clippings expressing his opposition to integration. A middle
page box boldly promised that if the incumbent was reelected, no white child
would ever sit in an integrated classroom.
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posting of bond at a place of their convenience: Los Angeles, At-
lanta, New York, etc. Instead, they literally laid in wait for me at the
Princeton Inn where I was scheduled to meet privately with Mrs. El-
eanor Roosevelt and a number of writers, faculty, and organizational
leaders, to plan strategy and an ad in the Washington Post. I did not
know several of those attending, and a spectacle was made as I ar-
rived and was arrested on the doorstep, taken away to Trenton, New
Jersey, and then held while the ACLU sent a messenger from New
York to post the usual bond. While being fingerprinted, the lone
agent in charge informally expressed appreciation for the stand that I
was taking. When I asked how he had located me at the Inn, as I had
not even known where we were to gather, he handed me a sheaf of
FBI inter-agency telegrams. They read like a searching guide for a
wanted criminal. The sheaves labeled me a suspect, indicated that I
might be found in Los Angeles, listed my private phone line among
others, and proclaimed that at 10:00 A.M. on that date I would be
found in Conference Room B at the Princeton Inn.
At the trial, since there was no factual dispute in the case, only a
matter for judicial judgment regarding precedents, we waived our
right to a jury trial. However, the government insisted on a jury trial,
but it was unnecessary and ridiculous under the circumstances. I told
Rowland Watts to accept the first twelve potential jurors. When they
were seated, the federal district court judge summoned counsel for
both sides to the bench and told them I was probably a stranger, and
therefore he would allow me a second chance to remove one of the
jurors, a member of the Atlanta Ku Klux Klan. I chose to let him
remain on the jury. The trial was most brief. It took the jurors only
twenty-three minutes to convict me and twenty-one minutes to con-
vict my co-defendant, Carl Braden.28 The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals quickly dispatched the matter, and as hoped, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.29
28. Under 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1999),
[e]very person who having been summoned as a witness by the
authority of either House of Congress to give testimony ... having
appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question un-
der inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a
fine... and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one
month nor more than twelve months.
29. See Wilkinson v. United States, 272 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1959), cert.
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An unusual event happened during oral arguments before the
Supreme Court. Alexander Meiklejohn and I attended together. As
he was to visit with one of the justices, I waited in the foyer until
called by a page, and was seated with Meiklejohn in the family sec-
tion of the Court. As the arguments proceeded, Justice Frankfurter
spotted Dr. Meiklejohn, called a page who delivered a note to him,
which Meiklejohn later handed to me with a look of disappointment.
Justice Frankfurter's note expressed his feeling that Meiklejohn's
First Amendment position was incorrect. We had, until then, held an
outside hope of securing his vote!
The Supreme Court's decision was rendered on February 27,
1961.30 It was five to four to uphold the convictions of Carl Braden
and me.3' Justice Potter Stewart based his decision for the majority
on the fact that Schneider was a "creditable" witness? 2 Good dis-
sents were filed by Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Douglas,
Brennan, and Black. Justice Black read his decision in full
and with force, joining the others' dissents. And, as stated above,
Black's dissent was truly prescient. He wrote:
So far as appears from this record, the only information
[HUAC] had with regard to [Wilkinson] was the testimony
of an informant at a previous [HUAC] hearing. The only
evidence to the effect that petitioner was in fact a member
of the Communist party that emerges from that testimony is
a flat conclusory statement by the informant that it was so.
No testimony as to particular happenings upon which such
a conclusion could rationally be based was given at that
hearing. When this fact is considered in conjunction with
the fact that petitioner was not accorded the opportunity to
cross-examine the informant ... such testimony is almost
totally worthless for the purpose of establishing probable
cause.
34
granted, 362 U.S. 926 (1960).
30. See Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 399 (1961).
31. See id.
32. See id. at412 n.9.
33. See id. at 415 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 423 (Douglas, J., dissenting);
id. at 429 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at418-19.
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After sixty days of appeals, we began serving our year sentences
in segregated hostile drunk tanks at Atlanta's Fulton County jail. We
had been deeply moved the prior evening when Dr. Martin Luther
King Jr. honored us with a reception with leading African American
clergy at Morehouse College.
Carl Braden and I served our time in South Carolina, Virginia,
Lewisburg Penitentiary in Pennsylvania, and at a minimum security
prison in Allenwood. During our term, we know now, all our corre-
spondence and activities fell under constant and intense FBI surveil-
lance. On some occasions we were nearly denied our good time be-
cause of FBI sponsored frame-ups. And on the day of our release,
we were kept under a technical rule until late in the day. It was the
FBI's attempt to prevent us from attending a massive welcome home
Pete Seeger Concert in New York City.
III. CONCLUSION
With the help of Watergate prosecutor Archibald Cox, we later
uncovered thirty-eight years of FBI surveillance and the
COINTELPRO operations of the FBI, including the initial 4000
pages of documents which gave us grounds to file our suit against the
FBI. 5 In 1989, we received an internal FBI document reading that
Anita Belle Schneider should not be used as a witness against me be-
cause she was emotionally unstable and not creditable. Because Ms.
Schneider's declaration that I was a Communist was the only evi-
dence on which HUAC relied, we then filed a writ of error coram
nobis36 to overturn my conviction, eighteen years after having served
my sentence, on the grounds that the FBI had withheld exculpatory
evidence.
Upon arrival in the federal district court in Atlanta, the judge in-
formed us that he had failed to notify the FBI legal staff of the time
35. That lawsuit became Wilkinson v. FBI, 633 F. Supp. 336 (C.D. Cal.
1986). Further, our FBI lawsuit availed us of another "smoking gun." In a
March 4, 1964, memorandum to J. Edgar Hoover, a Los Angeles FBI agent in
charge described a request for the FBI's assistance in my assassination.
36. If the petitioner has already served his sentence on a criminal convic-
tion, he can file a writ of coram nobis. "In federal coram nobis proceedings
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651, the relief granted usually consists of vacatur-
that is, the vacating and setting aside-of the conviction." WILKES, FEDERAL
POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF §§ 1-8 (1998 ed.).
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and date of our hearing. After a lunch delay, the judge invited both
sides into his chambers. He advised both sides that he would act on
the briefs, without hearing oral arguments. The judge ruled that be-
cause I was registered at a hotel under the ECLC, a suspected Com-
munist organization, HUAC had enough probable cause to call me to
testify before them, even without Ms. Schneider's testimony. There-
fore, he dismissed our coram nobis petition. 7
Since my attorneys and I felt that no evidence corroborated any
belief that ECLC was Communist controlled, other than Ms. Schnei-
der's testimony, we appealed the dismissal to the Eleventh Circuit .3
Unfortunately, that three-judge panel was equally unreceptive to our
arguments. On that record, we decided not to appeal to the United
States Supreme Court.
The injustice I received at the hands of HUAC and the FBI il-
lustrates the extreme fears and prejudices gripping this nation during
the so-called McCarthy Era. My stand against HUAC and its con-
stitutionality changed my life. It made me an absolutist, in the politi-
cal sense, on the First Amendment. It made me strive to ensure that
the protections of the First Amendment and the rest of the Bill of
Rights be afforded to all of us, even in times as repressive as the cold
war.
39
37. See Wilkinson v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
38. SeeWilldnsonv. United States, 959 F.2d 973 (11th Cir. 1992).
39. I learned a great deal in writing this Essay and it is hoped that others
can read this, share my experience, and learn from it.
